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Assets, as opposed to ordinary consumption goods or services, are long-lived and
therefore may be traded repeatedly. The opportunity of retrading assets creates a
new motive for trading based on the possibility of capital gains, namely, speculation.
In eﬀect, some agents may participate as buyers not because they value the asset,
but because they think that in the future it will be more valuable to somebody else.
As long as storage costs –either ﬁnancial or physical– are not too high relative to the
anticipated price change, it may be rational for someone with that belief –however
arrived at– to trade accordingly. This is particularly relevant for ﬁnancial assets,
characterized by low or null depreciation rates.
xiTwo questions are raised by the existence of speculation:
1. How are prices aﬀected? In particular, is it possible for asset prices to either
temporarily or permanently diﬀer from its fundamental value? Do asset prices
“reﬂect” in some coherent way all information that is pertinent for estimating
their fundamental value?
2. How is the resource allocation aﬀected? In particular, does the volume of
trade increase or is it the case that speculators’ presence substitutes for regular
investors? Will speculation promote a change in the market structure?
These essays discuss from a theoretical perspective two consequences of the exis-
tence of speculation in asset markets, namely, the possibility that informational eﬃ-
ciency does not obtain, and the bias towards intermediated market structures which
the need to defend from speculators creates.
Chapter 2, entitled “Informational Eﬃciency and Competition”, concludes that it
is competition and not the existence of information itself what determines the infor-
mational content of prices. Chapter 3, “On the Limits to Speculation in Centralized
versus Decentralized Market Regimes”, argues that a market maker can mitigate the
a d v e r s es e l e c t i o nc o s t st h a ts p e c u l a t o r simpose on regular investors. Chapter 1 oﬀers
a survey of the microeconomic theory of speculation.
xiiCHAPTER 1
Speculation in asset markets:
as u r v e y
Abstract
This survey covers the microeconomic theory of speculation in asset markets, since
the development of the economics of information. It starts with a description of Wal-
rasian exchange economies, both in general equilibrium –the Arrow-Debreu model–
and in partial equilibrium. Speculation, it is explained, is an incomplete-market phe-
nomenon. It proceeds by analyzing more general voluntary trade environments, with
af o c u so nw h e t h e ro rn o td i ﬀerences in information are a valid source for belief het-
erogeneity. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions of the no-trade theorem are discussed.
The review ends with a study of the bubble and speculative attack literatures, as the
most prominent consequences of the existence of speculation.
xiiiCHAPTER 2
Informational Eﬃciency and Competition
Abstract
In a market with random pairwise meetings among diﬀerentially informed
traders, it is shown that asset prices cannot reﬂect private information.
When informed speculators are able to trade anonymously, standard sig-
naling arguments guarantee that they will choose to pool themselves by
making the same oﬀer an uninformed investor would. This result is robust
to the informational structure of the game, although the volume of trade
m i g h tv a r y . H o w e v e r ,w h e nt r a d e r sh a v et oc o m p e t ef o rt h er i g h tt ob e
matched, the economy becomes informationally eﬃcient.
xivCHAPTER 3
On the limits to speculation
in centralized versus decentralized market regimes
Abstract
Speculation creates an adverse selection cost for utility traders, who will
choose not to trade if this cost exceeds the beneﬁts of using the asset
market. However, if they do not participate, the market collapses, since
private information alone is not suﬃcient to create a motive for trade.
Therefore, there is a limit to the amount of speculative transactions that
a given market can support. We compare this limit in decentralized
versus centralized market regimes, ﬁnding that the centralized regime is
more prone to speculation than the decentralized one: the transaction fees
charged by an intermediary diminish the individual return to information,
so that for a ﬁxed value of trading, more speculative transactions can
be supported. The analysis also suggests a reason for the existence of
intermediaries in ﬁnancial markets.
xvChapter 1
Speculation in asset markets:
as u r v e y
1.1 Introduction
To speculate in asset markets is to trade motivated exclusively by the possibility of
capital gains. It involves a belief, possibly divergent from the rest of market partic-
ipants, that leads the speculator to bet against them. It also involves a disposition
to act based on that belief. To explain the phenomenon of speculation, then, is to
explain under what conditions we are likely to observe belief-based trading, and also
how this trading activity changes market outcomes.
We start oﬀ by analyzing the conditions to observe speculation. These will be
conditions on the market structure, and on the sources of belief heterogeneity. Sec-
1tion 1.2 reviews Walrasian exchange economies, the standard model for competitive
environments, where it is established that a pre-condition for the existence of specu-
lation is that the market structure be incomplete. Section 1.3 extends the analysis
to more general voluntary trade arrangements, stressing the betting component of it,
and inquires whether diﬀerences in information are a valid source of belief hetero-
geneity. Section 1.4 covers the consequences of speculation, especially the possibility
of bubbles. Section 1.5 concludes.
The primary focus of this survey, it must be emphasized, is on the microeconomic
theory of speculation. This means the discussion of the period preceding the de-
velopment of the economics of information, with macroeconomic orientation –where
the accent is placed on the issue of economic stability/instability– is left aside. We
will only cite those results that are relevant to the more recent and formal discussion.
1.2 Walrasian exchange economies with
heterogeneous beliefs
Walrasian theory of markets emphasizes price taking and market taking: all market
participants (consumers and producers) regard prices and open markets as given, and
behave rationally with respect to those parameters (Makowski and Ostroy, 1995).
It is in this context that the present section addresses the problem of behavior un-
der heterogeneous beliefs. To focus on informational issues, we deal only with an
2exchange economy.
Debreu (1959) ﬁrst noticed that extending Walras’ model of competitive markets
to an intertemporal and uncertain environment could be done simply by reﬁning the
deﬁnition of commodity. Indeed, by treating a liter of milk today as a diﬀerent
object than a liter of milk tomorrow, and the liter of milk tomorrow if it happens
to rain as diﬀerently as if it does not –that is, by enlarging the commodity space–
one is able to analyze dynamic economies operating under uncertainty. There, he
makes the ﬁction of contingent claims being available as well as open markets for all
commodities just as in the certainty case. Thus, there is trading in LTΘ markets:
L goods, T dates and Θ states. In this view, the demand for assets originates on
the desire to move consumption across dates and states, that is, (ﬁnancial) assets are
useful because they allow consumption smoothing to risk-averse individuals.
1.2.1 The basic framework:
the two-period complete-market model
In this section we brieﬂy review the standard theory. Let i ∈ I denote individuals,
` ∈ L (perishable) consumption goods, t ∈ {0,1} time periods, θ ∈ Θ states of
nature or descriptions of the world in t =1 , Θ0 ≡ Θ ∪ {0}, πi prior beliefs over Θ,
wi
t ∈ RL(Θ+1) endowments, ui(ci
θ) ∈ C2 utility functions over consequences, k ∈ K
assets, and qk the price of an asset k.
3Debreu (1959) considers the case where there is complete agreement with regard
to the possible events (but not necessarily with respect to their likelihood) and where
all information is public. Hence, individuals choose the consumption vector xi of L
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θL). Thus, the budget constraint can be rewritten as





i) subject to b p
0(x
i − w
i) ≤ 0 (1.2)
A striking fact is that this problem does not formally diﬀer at all from the standard
problem in consumer theory under certainty. This formulation stresses the fact that
t h ec o n s u m e ri sc h o o s i n gd i ﬀerent bundles of consumption goods by buying a special
kind of ﬁnancial asset called “contingent claim”.
The equilibrium is characterized by:
Deﬁnition 1 A Walrasian equilibrium for the exchange economy E = {(wi,Ui)i∈I},
is a vector (b p,x) such that:









θ` ∀θ ∈ Θ0,`∈ L
Theorem 1 In this economy, the resulting allocation is Pareto-optimal ex-ante and
ex-post irrespective of beliefs.
This proposition, the ﬁrst theorem of welfare economics, establishes that all gains
from trade are exploited in one round of trade. Moreover, if markets were to reopen
after the true state is known, no trade would occur since the allocation would still
be Pareto-optimal (that is, also Pareto-optimal in an ex-post sense). To see this,
one only needs to verify that the gradient vector of every individual’s utility function
is proportional to each other, both ex-ante and ex-post. Ex-ante, we have that
∇Ui(xi) ∝ ∇Uj(xj) because there is a market open for each argument of the utility




















Ex-post, when uncertainty is resolved, the gradient vectors are going to be modi-





πθ if θ occurred
0 otherwise
by Bayes’ rule. If we only consider
the part of the vector xi that contains consumption of goods in the state that actually
5materialized, xi


























































Therefore, the opportunity of trading after uncertainty is resolved cannot improve
welfare, and the re-opening of the market will not induce consumers to trade. What
this implies, though, is that –in this economy– forecasting future asset prices is not
a ni s s u ea st h e r ew i l ln o tb eo p e nm a r k e t sin the future, and –subsequently– there
can be no speculation.
In eﬀect, any diﬀerences in belief with respect to the likelihood of any particular
state happening creates at time 0 a trade of contingent claims directly, that will pay
consumption goods if the state materializes, so that reversing the position will not be
necessary.
Arrow (1953) considers an otherwise similar economy, except that the securities
that can be traded are not contingent claims but “pure securities” (also known as
“Arrow securities”), that is, claims to 1 unit of account in state θ. There is trading
in Θ state-claims before the resolution of uncertainty, and in L goods after it. This
structure requires consumers to forecast consumption good prices pθ for each state.
However, since the only uncertainty refers to the state that will materialize (endow-
ments), it seems natural to assume that everyone agrees as to what prices will prevail































where b qθ is the price today of a pure asset that pays oﬀ in state θ and b ai
θ is the net




θwθ +b aθ i ft h e r ei sl o c a ln o n - s a t i a t i o n . T h e n ,w eh a v et h a t( 1 . 5 )

























which is equivalent to the contingent claim case when b ps` = b qsps`. This means
that the two economies are equivalent, in the sense that the consumption sets that
these markets give rise to are the same. It follows that there is no special role for
speculation either. Diﬀerences in beliefs as to the likelihood of a particular state
happening explain trade, but there is no opportunity of capital gains because there
are no price changes.
Finally, if instead of pure securities there were markets for ordinary securities,
that is, promises of payment of variable numbers of units of account contingent on
1In Radner’s (1972) terminology, expectations are “common”. See section 1.2.3 below.
7the occurrence of particular states, or put another way, bundles of pure securities,
matters would not be diﬀerent as long as we still have complete markets. In eﬀect, if
R is the Θ×K matrix that contains as columns the state-contingent payoﬀso ft h eK
assets in the Θ states, and if R is full rank (the complete-markets condition) then R−1
is the matrix specifying the portfolios of ordinary assets required to re-create a pure
security for each state. Therefore, the consumer has the same options as before2.
One should emphasize, however, that although there can be no speculation in this
setting, asset markets do oﬀer the opportunity of gambling, in the sense that people
bet on the occurrence of particular states every time they choose to “put” a larger
consumption bundle or larger units of account on them. Diﬀerences in opinion πi
give rise to trade, even if there were no other motives. Likewise, asset prices are
aﬀected by beliefs and their dispersion. Varian (1985) analyzes such relationship,
concluding that dispersion of beliefs may lower or increase asset prices depending on
how fast risk aversion responds to wealth.
1.2.2 More time periods and asymmetric information
The extension of the previous framework to more periods requires a reinterpretation
of the concept of state and the modeling of uncertainty. The standard approach is
to think of a state as a complete history, that is, a list of all actions taken by all
2This implicitly assumes the possibility of unlimited short sales, for no restrictions are put on
the sign of the entries in R−1. We will come back to this point later.
8individuals and nature at every time. Events, then, become the partial development
of history through time.
It is possible that some events do not aﬀect payoﬀs directly but may still aﬀect
beliefs (for instance, some moves from nature like sunspots). We will call them
“pure informational events” to distinguish them from the “real events” which we
have considered so far. Then, let us think of a state ω ∈ Ω as being composed of two
parts, ω =( θ,η),w h e r eθ is a speciﬁcation of the history of payoﬀ-relevant actions
whereas η is of payoﬀ-irrelevant actions.
In what follows, it will be useful to recall a few deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2 As e tH = {hn}H




n=1 hn = Ω and h ∩ h0 = φ ∀h,h0 ∈ H.
L e tu sd e n o t eb yh(ω) the element of H that contains ω.
Deﬁnition 3 Let H and H∗ be two partitions of Ω. H is said to be ﬁner than H∗
if h(ω) ⊆ h∗(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. If H is ﬁner than H∗,t h e nH∗ is said to be coarser
than H.
Events, then, are the elements of partitions ht ∈ Ht. The set of events will form
at r e e 3 represented by a sequence of partitions of Ω, {Ht}T
t=0,w h e r eHt is ﬁner than
Ht−1 (reﬂecting the increased knowledge) and HT = Θ.
3Formally, a tree is a set of nodes such that each node has a unique predecessor. This is necessary
to get a unique association between a state and a history, for if a terminal node had more than one








Figure 1-1: The event tree.
Figure 1-1 illustrates a situation where there are ﬁve states, each being a spec-
iﬁcation of, say, the actions of two persons at t =0and the choice of nature at
t =1 . The states are given by Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4,ω5},a n dt h et r e ec a nb e
represented by the partition sequence {{ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4,ω5}, {{ω1,ω2,ω3},{ω4,ω5}},
{{ω1},{ω2},{ω3},{ω4},{ω5}}}.
The list of actions will be enough to fully describe the world as long as everybody
understands the causal connections with other variables. For instance, prices can be
inferred unambiguously from quantities demanded and supplied when all individuals
share the same model. We will assume this is indeed the case unless otherwise noted.
Contrary to what we have done so far, we will also want to explicitly consider
the possibility that diﬀerent people have diﬀerent information, that is, that not all
aspects of reality are revealed simultaneously to all individuals. If the deﬁnition of a
state of the world is going to be fully comprehensive, that is, to specify all aspects of
reality potentially pertinent to decision making, then it must include not only the set
of actions taken but also who knows that those actions were taken, and who knows
10who is in possession of that knowledge, etc.
O n ew a yt oa c h i e v et h i si st od e ﬁne the informational structure as a state space Ω
together with a collection of partitions of Ω, {Hi
t}
i=1,...I
t=1,...,T. This allows the deﬁnition of
“personal” events as long as hi
t 6= h
j
t (consistent with the idea that what each person
sees of a common reality is diﬀerent, and therefore, with the existence of asymmetric
i n f o r m a t i o n ) ,w h i l ea tt h es a m et i m em a i n t a i n i n gt h ei d e n t i ﬁcation of the state with
all levels of mutual knowledge (if I know at time t that the state is ω,Ia l s ok n o w
what each person considers as possible {hi
t(ω)}I
i=1, and what each of them thinks
about what everybody else considers as possible, etc.4).
In cases where there is uncertainty but information is symmetric, we drop the
superscript i since {Hi
t}T
t=0 is common to all consumers. Similarly, we drop the time
subscript when there is only one period left.
As for the previous models, with symmetric information, contingent claims are
now related to events and not to states, and the same holds for contingent payments
o fa s s e t s ,e i t h e rp u r eo ro r d i n a r y .
As for beliefs, rationality requires them to be updated according to Bayes’ rule,
4Aumann suggests this is tautological, for part of the deﬁnition of the state is what each agent
knows abouth the knowledge of others. Nevertheless, the issue is not completely resolved. See
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Radner (1972) presents what is nowadays the standard framework to analyze incomplete-
market symmetric-information economies, that is, cases where “at every date and for
every commodity there will be some future dates and some events at those dates for
w h i c hi tw i l ln o tb ep o s s i b l et om a k ec u r r e n tcontracts for future delivery contingent
on those events”. Expectations are common if all traders associate the same prices
t ot h es a m ee v e n t s ,a n da r econsistent if the anticipated excess demands are zero. It
should be noted that we have already assumed common and consistent expectations
throughout. In this setting, there is a nontrivial role for sequential trading because
the opportunity of retrading the same assets is valuable as it enlarges the budget set.
Hence, retrading acts as a substitute for inexistent markets5.
Hirshleifer (1975) exempliﬁes this idea. His model corresponds to a two-good
economy in which there are two rounds of trade, before and after the arrival of (pri-
vate6) information, and consumption occurs at the last date. However, markets are
5This idea is further developed in Duﬃe and Huang (1985).
6Although the text considers the possibility that the information received by each trader is
diﬀerent, the model makes no special treatment of it. Moreover, since priors diﬀer, posteriors would
diﬀer too, even though the information received is the same. See section 1.2.
12incomplete since there are contingent claims for only one good; the second good must
be traded incontingently. In the anticipation of a price change, individuals would
trade to move from their endowment to a trading position, while they would trade
again to go to the consumption position once the uncertainty is resolved. The incom-
pleteness creates the need for trading in the second round, for as we have seen, under
ac o m p l e t em a r k e tr e g i m ec o n s u m e r sc o u l dc h o o s ed i r e c t l yt h eﬁnal consumption
bundle of contingent commodities, and any diﬀerences in beliefs would be reﬂected
on date-zero prices. In fact, as pointed out in Hirshleifer (1977), “in the prior round
each trader would be able to buy a portfolio covering his desired consumption baskets
i nt h el i g h to ft h ea l t e r n a t i v ep o s s i b l ei n f o r m a t i o n - e v e n t sa sw e l la so v e rt h ed i ﬀerent
state-contingencies”.
Thus, the intuitive conclusion that speculation occurs owing to diﬀering anticipa-
tions of price changes (and cannot be a consequence of a redistribution of risks) holds
because price changes are a necessary condition for completing the market via con-
tingent trading, i.e., to substitute for missing markets. Rubinstein (1975) expands
on this idea by considering a three-date Arrow-Debreu economy, where a complete
set of real-event contingent claims is available at every date but no information-event
contingent claim and there is only one consumption good. Apart from showing
the Pareto-optimality of this economy, which holds because retrading substitutes for
market-completeness, he proposes three alternative ways to think of the concept of
prices reﬂecting all available information: non-speculative beliefs are those beliefs for
13which no portfolio revision is an optimal strategy; consensus beliefs are those beliefs
which if held by all individuals in an otherwise similar economy, would generate the
same equilibrium prices as in the actual heterogeneous economy.
Grundy and McNichols (1990) show that if it is known in advance that the market
will be open in the future, it is not clear at all that agents would prefer ap r i o r ito trade
in any of the available rounds in particular. In other words, if the market is known
to reopen, it might be very active, but it is only so because it is necessary to complete
transactions that could have been done in the ﬁrst round but just weren’t. Therefore,
giving a nontrivial role to future rounds of trade requires the incompleteness of the
set of available markets.
Up to this point, we have seen that existing asset markets allow individuals to
smooth consumption and/or gamble. Speculation –trading and retrading based on
belief heterogeneity– arises only if the market structure is incomplete, and has to be
seen as the natural consequence of the need to substitute for missing markets. The
next section generalizes the economy to consider any voluntary trading arrangement,
that is, markets where any trade must be acceptable to all participants –be it under
given prices or not–. In this setting, the question of whether or not diﬀerences in
information are a valid source of belief heterogeneity is explored.
141.3 The possibility of speculation
1.3.1 Speculation as a betting game
Ultimately, when an income stream is chosen over another, one could say that there
is an implicit bet over the likelihood of the states where income is increased. In fact,
buying a share in the hope of a price rise is to bet on a price increase. More precisely,
Deﬁnition 4 Ab e ti saf u n c t i o nb : Θ −→ RI specifying for each state θ av e c t o ro f
monetary payoﬀs bθ =( b1
θ,...,bI




θ =0.P l a y e r i is said
to have bet $b on state θ if, whenever some state θ
0 ∈ ΘÂ{θ} occurs, bi
θ0 = −b.
T h u s ,ab e ti sav e c t o ro ft r a n s f e r st h a tm u s tb ea g r e e du p o nb ya l lp a r t i c i p a n t s .






























It is important to kept in mind, though, that implicit on it there are beliefs,
and there is knowledge that provides a basis for them. The function vi(bi), then,
evaluates income streams on the basis of preferences, beliefs, and endowments. In
particular, vi(bi) can evaluate bets.
15Ab e tb =( b






i) ∀i ∈ I (1.9)
O n em a yw i s ht os e p a r a t eo u tw h a tp a r to fat r a d ei sd u et od i ﬀerences in beliefs
and what part is due to consumption smoothing. Let e b be the bet that would
be carried over if all beliefs would coincide7,t h a ti s ,πi = e π ∀i ∈ I.S u c h a
state-contingent transfer would of course be justiﬁed by the structure of endowments
and risk aversion. Then, b b≡(b−e b) would be due entirely to diﬀerences in beliefs.
Speculation, in this sense, would be the act of betting on some states based on deviant
expectations. For if beliefs would coincide, then there would be no speculation at
all.
It can readily be seen that this is exactly what is done in a Walrasian economy
where Arrow—securities are traded. Security markets give the opportunity of betting
in the above sense, because of diﬀerences in beliefs, endowments, or risk aversion.
The only special feature of Walrasian economies is the way in which the available












and the fact that
q satisﬁes market-clearing.
7We simply assume such a bet exists.
16The present analysis, then, has the advantage that it includes, but is not limited
to, Walrasian economies, for it can serve as a characterization of any voluntary process
of trade. This is the environment used by Milgrom and Stokey (1982) to study the
rational expectations equilibria, to which we turn in the next section.
1 . 3 . 2 B e t t i n gi sr u l e do u tb yc o m m o nk n o w l e d g e
So far we have assumed belief heterogeneity without paying special attention to the
sources of that heterogeneity. Indeed, the Walrasian tradition has been to treat
beliefs as exogenous variables, just like utility functions. Each person then makes
decisions based on observed prices without worrying about the origin of those prices
because the information concerning why a relative price took a particular value –
whether it can be traced back to beliefs, preferences, technology, etc.– is completely
useless. An implicit assumption, then, is that information is symmetric, that is, the
event tree {Ht}T
t=1 is common.
However, when beliefs are aﬀected by information, and information is not public
but heterogeneously distributed among society members –a more realistic setting–
any inference that one can obtain by observing other agents’ behavior becomes valu-
able because it may improve decision making.
Common wisdom points to diﬀerences in information as the main source of be-
lief heterogeneity. Speculators, in possession of more or better information, would
be better-than-average forecasters earning a return for their social contribution in
17keeping prices in line with available information, which improves the quality of in-
vestments. This is in gross terms the view of Working (1953), and also what Fama
(1970) had in mind when discussing the eﬃcient market hypothesis.
Lintner (1969) illustrates how prices would aggregate these disperse judgments, in
a partial equilibrium model in the Walrasian tradition. In the particular case of nor-
mally distributed returns and exponential utility functions –the “normal-exponential
model”, which later became standard in ﬁnance theory– it is shown that the equi-
librium asset price is measurable with respect to the vector of private signals {hi}I
i=1.
This view, however, was challenged by the then novel theory of rational expecta-
tions, which basically asserts that if agents are rational, they should recognize that
the way prices are formed makes them useful pieces of information in their own right.
Moreover, under some conditions, they become suﬃcient statistics of all private sig-
nals, providing a better guide than each particular piece of information by itself. In
the normal-exponential setting, Grossman (1976) shows that private information is
redundant once the price is known. But this entails a paradox: “When a price
system is a perfect aggregator of information it removes private incentives to collect
information”; but then, if no information is collected, there is no information to be
transmitted by prices. In turn, the absence of information in prices generates returns
to be appropriated by those who gather information.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) treated this issue by introducing the notion of noise
traders. In their model, a random shock to the asset supply is added so that no
18individual can perfectly infer the signal vector just by looking at the price. As the
inferential process is limited in this fashion, private returns to information gathering
activities are restored. This class of model is often referred to as noisy rational
expectations models, which were developed further by Hellwig (1980), Diamond and
Verrechia (1981), Admati (1985), Kyle (1985), and Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1986).
Although the noise trader approach proved useful for analyzing information ac-
quisition and aggregation under diﬀerent market structures, the exogenous behavior
of some agents on which it relies is not entirely satisfactory, for it raises the doubt
as to what is the necessary feature to obtain incomplete inference, so that a com-
petitive equilibrium can exist, be it some behavioral irrationality, limited inference
capabilities, or bounded rationality of some other kind. In other words, the source
of noise trading is at least as obscure as the source of the diﬀerences in beliefs that
these models tried to illuminate.
Fortunately, some striking results in the literature on common knowledge, started
by Lewis (1969) in philosophy and Aumann (1976) in economics, helped clarify the
i s s u eo fw h e t h e ro rn o td i ﬀerences in information are a valid source of belief het-
erogeneity. Although perhaps creating some extra confusion initially, with answers
overly stated on the negative side in the pioneering work of Milgrom and Stokey
(1982), it was possible to understand that full revelation is obtained with the conju-
gation of common knowledge of actions, common priors and an initial Pareto-optimal
allocation. It is important to stress the fact that none of these ingredients is traceable
19directly to the individuals’ own rationality. Therefore, the no-speculation (and/or
no-trade) paradox was not due to the rationality assumption8 but to the conjunction
of ancillary assumptions of the rational expectation hypothesis, like common priors.
The remainder of this section will be devoted to review these results in more detail.
Subsection 1.2.2 showed that information can be modelled as the knowledge of
an event hi
t(ω), which is a particular element of a partition Hi
t of Ω.T h i s h a s t h e
interpretation that agent i knows at time t that the true state is one of the elements of
hi
t(ω),a m o n gw h i c hh ec a n n o tr e c o g n i z ei t– r e ﬂecting the remaining uncertainty–
and that he also can safely discard any ω0 ∈ Ω\hi
t(ω). W h a tf o l l o w si sa na n a l y s i so f
a static problem and consequently the time subscript is dropped.
Since all the individuals’ partitions {Hj}j∈I are known, then knowledge of hi
t(ω)
also implies knowledge of what other agents may know, for individual i cannot reject
the possibility that individual j knows hj(ω0) for any ω0 ∈ hi(ω). Mutual knowledge
is, then, implied this way by the state and the informational structure.
Deﬁne the knowledge operator as
Ki(E)={ω ∈ Ω : h
i(ω) ⊆ E} (1.10)
which has the interpretation that player i knows that event E occurred if E cannot
be ruled out in any of the states he considers as possible. Similarly, when individual
8Of course, irrationality can eliminate the paradox too, but it is not necessary.
20i at ω cannot reject any of the states in which j knows E,t h e ni knows that j knows
E:
ω ∈ Ki (Kj(E)) (1.11)
Lengthier iterations of the knowledge operator reﬂect higher levels of mutual knowl-
edge. It will be useful now to bear in mind the following deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 5 Let H = {Hi}i∈I be a collection of partitions of a set Ω.T h e m e e t o f
H is its ﬁnest common coarsening, M(ω)=∪I ∪i∈I hi(ω),a n dt h ej o i no fH is its
coarsest common reﬁnement, J(ω)=∩i∈Ihi(ω).9
The join has a ready interpretation: it indicates what is the maximum knowledge
in society, which would be obtained if everyone were to pool his information with
everybody else’s. It is clear that if information were public, everybody’s partitions
would coincide and be equal to their join. On the other hand, one can deﬁne infor-
mation that is public in some states but not necessarily at every state: information
is public at ω if hi(ω)=hj(ω) ∀i,j ∈ I. The meet, in turn, is useful to deﬁne what
events are commonly known:
Deﬁnition 6 (Aumann, 1976) An event E is common knowledge if M(ω) ⊆ E.
Clearly, if hi(ω) ⊆ E then agent i considers E to be true in every state he sees
as possible. This is also true for every i ∈ I,s i n c ehi(ω) ⊆ M(ω).M o r e o v e r , a l l
9The meet and the join are themselves partitions of Ω, and they are unique. See Genakoplos
(1993) for a proof.
21iterations of the form Kk (Kj(...Ki(ω))) are also true, so mutual knowledge is true
even in inﬁnite regressions.
Aumann not only develops this formal deﬁnition of common knowledge, but also
proves the impossibility of agreeing to disagree: two individuals with common priors
that obtain diﬀerent information, cannot have diﬀerente posteriors if they are com-
monly known. This result forms the basis for the no-speculation theorems and the
stronger no-speculation results.
Milgrom and Stokey (1982) provide the following10:
Theorem 2 Suppose all traders are risk-averse, that the initial allocation is Pareto-
optimal, that agents’ prior beliefs are common, and that each player i observes the
information conveyed by the partition Hi. I fi ti sc o m m o nk n o w l e d g ea tω that b
is a feasible trade and that each trader weakly prefers it to the zero trade, then every
agent is indiﬀerent between b and the zero trade. If all agents are strictly risk averse
then b is the zero trade.
Thus, Geanakoplos (1993), in an excellent survey on common knowledge, asserts
that “The main conclusion is that an apparently innocuous assumption of common
knowledge rules out speculation, betting, and agreeing to disagree”. Speciﬁcally, he
provides a proof of the following:
10Aside from notational diﬀerences, their theorem was stated with a softer assumption, namely,
concordant beliefs rather than common priors. See Morris (1994).
22Theorem 3 Let (Ω,(Hi,A i,s i)i∈I) be given, where Ω is a set of states of the world,
Hi is a partition on Ω, Ai is an action set, and the strategy si : Ω −→ Ai speciﬁes
the action agent i takes at each ω ∈ Ω,f o ra l li ∈ I.S u p p o s e t h a t si is generated
by the decision rule ψi :2 Ω −→ Ai satisfying the sure-thing principle11.( T h u s
si(ω)=ψi(hi(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω,i∈ I.)I f f o r e a c h i it is common knowledge at ω
that si takes on the value ai, then there is some single event E such that ψi(E)=ai
for every i ∈ I.
In the context of this survey, the ψi function corresponds to the strategy that
player i follows (indicating what to do at every information set hi(ω) he may ﬁnd
himself in). The theorem, then, establishes that the same action proﬁle could have
been obtained with symmetric information in an otherwise similar game. Hence, the
informational asymmetry is not the explanation for the observed actions.
Special cases of the above theorem are Aumann’s agreeing to disagree result and
Milgrom and Stokey’s no-trade theorem. In fact, the following example is provided
by the latter to see the role of common knowledge in the no-trade theorem:
Example 1 (Milgrom and Stokey 1982) There are two payoﬀ-relevant states, Θ =
{θ1,θ2}. Two players must simultaneously decide whether they accept or reject a bet
in the following terms: if state θ1 materializes, player 2 (she) pays $1 to player 1 (he);
if θ2 occurs, the reverse payment is carried out. Before making a decision, however,
11The sure-thing principle says that if ψ(A)=ψ(B)=a and A∩B = φ,t h e nψ(A∪B)=a. See
Savage (1972).
23each of them gets to see a private signal (information event) within the following
sets: H1 = {{η1,η2},{η3,η4},{η5}} and H2 = {{η1},{η2,η3},{η4,η5}},w h i c hi n
fact are two distinct partitions of Λ = {η1,η2,η3,η4,η5}. They have common priors
on (Θ × Λ) given by
η1 η2 η3 η4 η5
θ1 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.05
θ2 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.20
Suppose the true message is η3. Should they bet? The answer is no if there is
common knowledge of rationality. To see this, imagine ﬁrst that the players are
rational but they are not aware of their opponent’s rationality. Then, each player





















As both are positive, they would accept. Moreover, if each of them knew that his/her
opponent is rational too, they would not only check their own answer but also their
opponent’s answer, according to the information they could have received. Indeed,






















her acceptance does not tell him anything new and his original calculation is still the
most accurate. Similarly, she observes that his behavior would be the same irrespective





















However, the analysis would be diﬀerent with one more level of knowledge of mutual
rationality. Suppose that not only player 1 knows she is rational, but also that he
knows that she knows that he is rational. In that case, when receiving message {η3,η4}
he knows she could have received messages {η2,η3} or {η4,η5}, which in turn implies
she would consider cases where he receives messages {η1,η2},{η3,η4}, or {η5}.T h e n
s h ek n o w s ,h er e a s o n s ,t h a ti fh ea c c e p t ss h ec a ns a f e l ya s s u m et h em e s s a g ew a sn o t
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Similarly, as she would reject the bet when the message is {η1} and he knows it, he in
turn would not accept when receiving {η1,η2} as a message. But this leaves us with
the message η3 as the only candidate for simultaneous acceptance of the bet. As in







(−1) = 0 = E[u2|{η3}]
where their expectations have converged (negating asymmetric information) and there
are no gains from trade.
Remark 1 All this complicated string of reasoning is embedded in the deﬁnition of
Nash equilibrium. Once common priors on the possible states of the world are as-
sumed, the assumptions of common knowledge of rationality and common priors on
the opponent’s behavior are invoked when looking at a Nash equilibrium. In eﬀect, as
shown in Aumann (1987), those assumptions are equivalent to correlated equilibrium,
of which Nash equilibrium is a special case.
26The above example, for instance, has an associated normal form
s1 \ s2 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
000 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
001 0,0 -.15,.15 0,0 -.15,.15 0,0 -.15,.15 0,0 -.15,.15
010 0,0 .10,-.10 0,0 .10,-.10 0,0 .10,-.10 0,0 .10,-.10
011 0,0 -.05,.05 0,0 -.05,.05 0,0 -.05,.05 0,0 -.05,.05
100 0,0 0,0 -.10,.10 -.10,.10 .15,-.15 .15,-.15 .05,-.05 .05,-.05
101 0,0 -.15,.15 -.10,.10 -.25,.25 .15,-.15 0,0 .05,-.05 -.10,.10
110 0,0 .10,-.10 -.10,.10 0,0 .15,-.15 .25,-.25 .05,-.05 .15,-.15
111 0,0 -.05,.05 -.10,.10 -.15,.15 .15,-.15 .10,-.10 .10,-.10 0,0
where acceptance is represented by a 1 and rejection by a 0. The knowledge of the
opponent’s partition is implied by the knowledge of his/her strategy. This game has
four pure-strategy Nash equilibria (in bold), none of them corresponding to the com-
mon wisdom that an auspicious private message will induce betting (strategy proﬁle
s =( 1 1 0 ,011) in the example). Following theorem 10, ψ1({η3,η4})=ψ2({η2,η3})=
ψ1({η3})=ψ2({η3})=0 .
These ﬁndings explain Kreps’ (1977) and Tirole’s (1982) impossibility of specula-
tion in rational expectations economies. The common prior and common knowledge
27assumptions are embedded on (most) rational expectations models12, which explains
Tirole’s claim that “speculation relies on inconsistent plans and is ruled out by rational
expectations”. Moreover, rational expectations models also assume von Neumann-
Morgestern utility functions, that is, the state preference approach. We discuss next
the robustness of the no-trade result to each assumption separately:
Common knowledge
Even though breaking down common knowledge leads to trade, as we saw in ex-
ample 1, Fudenberg and Levine (1994) show that solution concepts not involving
common knowledge, like ε−self-conﬁrming equilibria and ε−marginal best response
distributions, also give rise to the same no-trade result as the asymptotic outcome
of a learning process, where everything else is as above (common priors and ex-ante
Pareto-optimal allocation). The reason for this is that any probability distribution
over socially feasible outcomes that Pareto-dominates the endowment must involve
no-trade. This means that the zero-sum feature of pure speculation is too strong.
Partitional information
Another extension that has been pursued is to adapt a less restrictive model of knowl-
edge. In particular, it has been shown (see Samet (1990) and Geanakoplos (1989))
12There is more than one deﬁnition of rational expectations equilibria. See McAllister (1990) for
ad i s c u s s i o no fd i ﬀerent concepts, and a deﬁnition that explicitly considers beliefs about beliefs and
common knowledge of rationality and market clearing as well. An interesting feature of his concept
is that it does not involve full revelation.
28that to represent an information structure by a partition of a state space is equiv-
alent to assume not only that at each state the individual knows what he knows
and knows that he knows it, but also that he knows that he does not know what he
does not know. This latter assumption has been judged too demanding, particularly
when facing very large state spaces. However, dropping this assumption does not
automatically generate trade, for there is a minimum degree of irrationality needed.
Awareness and non-expected utility
Ghirardato (1995) provides a model of decision making in the spirit of Savage’s (1972),
except that the decision maker does not fully understand the connection between ac-
tion and consequences, and is aware of that unawareness. An axiom about ignorance
resolution allows him to obtain a representation of preferences over acts, which cor-
responds to an expected utility where the expectation is taken with respect to a
non-additive belief function, a so-called non-expected utility; this is a formulation
previously obtained under diﬀerent axioms in the literature on “Knightian uncer-
tainty” (see, for instance, Schmeidler(1989), and references therein; further support
for non-expected utility but this time by a biological argument of ﬁttest rather than
axiomatically, can be found in Robson (1996)). An important result in this approach
is in Dow and Werlang (1992), who assert that non-expected utility is a source of in-
action, creating, for example, a “bid-ask spread property” for security trading, that is,
a price-interval where the individual will not want to either buy or sell. Trade could
29occur after the arrival of information even with an ex-ante Pareto-optimal allocation,
Ghirardato argues, because information may shrink this inaction interval. Just like
in the case of non-partitional information structures, however, the extent to which
trade is driven by irrationality or absence-of-omniscience is still under discussion.
Dow, Madrigal and Werlang (1990), on the other hand, claim that provided com-
mon knowledge of the desirability of the trade and state-additivity of preferences are
assumed, the no-trade result goes through. In other words, it cannot be a con-
sequence of learning from opponents’ behavior (ex-post partitions need not be ﬁner
than ex-ante partitions) and, in consequence, an adverse selection phenomenon. Fur-
thermore, as suggested in the previous paragraph, non-expected utility creates trade
because of a lack of state-additivity.
Common priors
If priors were heterogeneous, even the same information would generate trade, for in-
dividuals would obtain diﬀerent conclusions from it and could “agree to disagree”13’14.
Morris (1995) challenges the so-called “Harsanyi doctrine”, namely that diﬀerences in
belief can only come from diﬀerences in information and that, therefore, the common
prior assumption is not only reasonable but tautological. He argues that the basis for
13Provided, of course, markets are incomplete. This scenario actually corresponds to the model
in section 2.2.
14Not any diﬀerence in prior beliefs, however, will invalidate the no-trade result. See Morris
(1994).
30this claim is weak, for logic can only tell us how to change beliefs, not how to choose
a prior. Moreover, the construction of the inﬁnite hierarchy of beliefs that exhausts
the uncertainty of each individual about others lends no support to the common prior
assumption. Thus, the existence of common priors is not tautological, and there are
good reasons to accept the subjective probability approach15.
Ex-ante Pareto-optimality
Even holding to the Harsanyi doctrine, we could think of the no-trade results as
establishing the impossibility of purely speculative markets, that is, as saying that
private information cannot be a unique source of trading. Nevertheless, one can
hardly say that at any point in time it is commonly known that there are only
speculators in the market. A prior round of trade, for instance, may fail to produce a
Pareto-optimal allocation, even with complete markets. As Grundy and McNichols
(1990) show, if the market is known to reopen, individuals may well use both rounds
to achieve their optimal consumption bundles.
The relevant question seems to be not whether private information in isolation can
generate trade, but whether it is capable of aﬀecting the total volume of trade in an
economy where consumption smoothing, insurance, liquidity and any other possible
motive already played a role. The answer to this question appears to be, at least at
an intuitive level, a strong “yes”. Ross (1989), for instance, says that “It is diﬃcult
15S e ef o o t n o t e2a b o v e .
31to imagine that the volume of trade in security markets has very much to do with the
modest amount of trading required to accomplish the continual and gradual portfolio
balancing inherent in our current intertemporal models.”
From that perspective, models that explain the eﬀects of speculation on prices
and trading volume ought to include traders with diverse motives. The next section
focuses on such models, with emphasis on price eﬀects.
1.4 Consequences of speculation
1.4.1 Bubbles and crashes
It is said that a bubble exists on an asset if its price diﬀers from its fundamental value,
that is, the expected present discounted value of dividends. Many pieces of evidence
prompt us to believe in the existence of bubbles. Perhaps the most compelling ar-
gument is that the observed market booms and sudden crashes observed throughout
the history of ﬁnancial systems are diﬃcult to reconcile with a fundamentalist expla-
nation, especially since it has been hard to ﬁnd an event important enough to explain
the magnitude of the changes. Classical examples are the October 1929 and October
1987 episodes, the South Sea Bubble and the tulip mania last century, documented
in Kindleberger (1989) and White (1990) and discussed in Garber (1990). On the
other hand, the excess volatility puzzle (Shiller (1981), Shiller (1990), discussed in
Kleindon (1986)), namely, the cumulated evidence that asset prices move far in excess
32of what would be justiﬁed by changes in dividends, arises as indirect evidence in favor
of non-fundamental determinants of asset prices.
The common prior approach
Tirole (1982, 1985) explains that bubbles cannot occur in inﬁnite perfectly com-
petitive economies under rational expectations, but they can in growing overlapping
generations economies. To understand this, one has to see that an arbitrage argu-
ment breaks them down. If a bubble is known to be present in an asset, anybody
could short-sell that asset to buy it after the burst. On the other hand, this ar-
gument cannot work in overlapping generations because the bubble may exceed an
individual investors’ life. Thus, if everyone believes that the price of an asset is going
to rise indeﬁnitely in the future, every new generation of investors will be willing to
buy it in the certainty (or almost certainty with stochastic bubbles) of being able to
sell it later. If the economy is growing, there is no potential problem of the price
becoming higher than total wealth, which otherwise would rule out the bubble by a
transversality condition.
In Jackson (1994), a set of private payoﬀ-irrelevant signals may help to correlate
bidding behavior (the market at each period is a Vickrey auction) and therefore to
create and sustain a bubble. Since private signals are correlated, a good signal today
is an indication of a high price tomorrow. Not using this information is harmful,
provided everybody else is using it. Moreover, this equilibrium is strict, so it survives
33reﬁnements.
Similarly, Bhattacharyya and Lipmann (1995), using a bargaining game, construct
an equilibrium where the bubble builds up every period because there is uncertainty
about individual wealth levels. Once the maximum wealth is reached, the bubble
bursts. Their model departs from Tirole’s in that there is bargaining rather than
price-taking, and the equilibrium requires interim rater than ex-ante rationality (on
this latter point see also Morris (1994)).
Lee (1995), taking a diﬀerent approach but still based on rationality, explains
market crashes as a failure in information aggregation. Following the cascade liter-
ature, he notes that traders may not use their information, say bad news, if before
them many traders evidence good news. Indeed, it would be rational for them to
“follow the crowd” if their information is more powerful than his own, or do nothing
in the presence of transaction costs. But this will be true for any trader after him,
because at that point learning stops. Later, any small change may trigger an abrupt
change in behavior, since the true information vector will be revealed. This argument
implies that crashes and avalanches are correcting mechanisms of previous bubbles
(in the sense that total information in society warrants a diﬀerent fundamental).
H a r ta n dT a u m a n( 1 9 9 7 )a l s oh a v ea r g u e dt h a tm a r k e tc r a s h e sm a yc o m ea st h e
outcome of endogenous information processing in the spirit of example 1 above, that
is, as a getting-to-common-knowledge problem. Still, their conclusions are puzzling
since they would seem to contradict the no-trade theorem.
34Finally, Madrigal and Sheikman (1997) present a model in which a market maker
sets prices strategically in order to proﬁt from the information obtained from the
order ﬂow. They show that the price-functions may present discontinuities, which
they interpret as crashes.
Heterogeneous prior models
Harrison and Kreps (1978) deﬁne speculation somewhat diﬀerently: “investors exhibit
speculative behavior if the right to resell a stock makes them more willing to pay more
for it than they would pay if obliged to hold it forever”. They develop a partial
equilibrium model with risk-neutral investors that hold heterogeneous expectations
over the dividend process a single security follows. At every point in time, the
equilibrium price must be (weakly) larger than what any particular investor might
think the worth is –the diﬀerence being the bubble. It is important to note, though,
that this concept actually corresponds to the option value associated to the possibility
of resale, that is, to the liquidity of the asset. What heterogeneous expectations do
is increase the value of the resale option. Stout (1995) adds that heterogeneity in
posteriors is more likely to appear as a result of exogenous technological or economic
developments, which are hard to interpret.
These ideas agree with Keynes’ notion of long-term expectations, and how liquidity
may aﬀect the market outcome:
“Of the maxims of orthodox ﬁnance none, surely, is more anti-social than
35t h ef e t i s ho fl i q u i d i t y ,t h ed o c t r i n et h a ti ti sap o s i t i v ev i r t u eo nt h ep a r t
of investment institutions to concentrate their resources upon the holding
of ‘liquid’ securities. It forgets that there is no such thing as liquidity of
investment for the community as a whole. The social object of skilled
investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance
which envelop our future. The actual, private object of the most skilled
investment to-day is ‘to beat the gun’, as the Americans so well express
it, to outwit the crowd, and to pass the bad, or depreciating, half-crown
to the other fellow.” (The General Theory, page 155).
Along the same line, Harris and Raviv (1993) show that the heterogeneous prior
assumption16 generates predictions consistent with the data, which would be diﬃcult
to reconcile with the rational expectations approach. For instance, the fact that trade
volume is greater after public announcements, and the positive correlation between
volume and absolute price changes.
Detemple and Murthy (1994) analyze the consequences of prior heterogeneity
in a continuous-time single-good economy. All investors observe the same news
and evolution of random shocks to aggregate technology; yet, each type of agent
holds diﬀerent beliefs as to the prospects of investments –for arbitrary long periods
16When they say they assume common priors in the paper, they refer to the marginal over payoﬀ-
relevant events θ and not to the actual prior over states ω. As the conjugate posteriors are diﬀerent
(“what they call diﬀerent models”), then their priors over Ω must diﬀer.
36of time– which leads them to hold diﬀerent portfolios. Asset prices are weighted
averages of those that would prevail in homogeneous agent economies. They do not,
however, explicitly consider the issues of bubbles and crashes.
Daniel et al. (1998), in a provoking article, base the heterogeneity on well-
established deviations from rationality17 in the psychology literature, namely, investor
over-reaction and biased self-attribution. The main argument starts with the obser-
vation that a large amount of evidence has accumulated that is inconsistent with the
rationality assumption, most notably the excess volatility puzzle, the equity premium
puzzle and a series of asset pricing anomalies. When the cited anomalies are incor-
porated, the argument goes, it is possible to reproduce parsimoniously the patterns
in the data in a way that other forms of irrationality would not. A related study by
Levine (1982) shows, by the same token, that some observed patterns in prices can be
reproduced by a model that assumes some investors are fundamentalists –demand
is the result of value assessment– while some are chartists –who believe changes
in asset prices are a signal of value–. This model is consistent, in particular, with
the fact that prices rise gradually but fall suddenly, and that there are more price
runs than predicted by random chance. These studies show that although testing
for bubbles is diﬃcult in general (Flood and Hodrick (1990)), there are some indirect
ways of looking at the data that reveal inconsistencies with the fundamentalist view
17In the sense, probably, of sistematic deviations of subjects’ beliefs from ‘objective’ distributions.
37and at the same time could be assimilated to some particular forms of irrationality.
Survival
An important point relates to the survival in the market of “wrong models” of this
sort. Friedman (1953) is generally interpreted as raising this point, when saying:
“People who argue that speculation is destabilizing seldom realize that this
is largely equivalent to saying that speculators lose money, since specula-
tion can be destabilizing in general only if speculators on the average sell
when the currency is low in price and buy when it is high.” (Essays in
Positive Economics, page 175).
To complete the argument, we need to add that those who lose money will be
forced to leave the market, thereby only ‘rational’ or ‘right’ speculators –who will
stabilize prices– will be selected.
The ﬁrst part of the argument, the one established by Friedman, has been proven
wrong from a logical perspective in a number of studies, notably Hart and Kreps
(1986). The authors construct couterexamples to it, basically replacing the idea
that rational speculators “buy cheap and sell dear” with “buy when the chances of
appreciation are high, and sell when the chances of depreciation are high”, which
obviously may or may not be when prices are high and low, respectively. Thus,
speculators may make money –and therefore survive– and destabilize prices.
38Similarly, De Long et al. (1991) show, in a context more closely connected to
our previous idea of irrational traders, that those traders may not only survive, but
even dominate the market, eventually. Indeed, the group of overconﬁdent investors
–that is, those who underestimate risks– will risk more; as long as the market
rewards risk-taking, its wealth may increase over the long run even up to the point of
dominating the group of rational investors, and despite of the fact that they are more
likely to become ruined and that their overconﬁdence makes them consume more.
Kyle and Wang (1997) raise an additional source of supremacy in the context of a
duopoly game: overconﬁdent investors may outperform rational investors because
overconﬁdence may act like a commitment device.
1.4.2 Speculative attacks
The issue of speculative attacks is somewhat diﬀerent from the problem of the possi-
bility of speculation addressed in section 1.3, for in this case the gains to speculators
would come from a government and, as long as it does not maximize “proﬁts”, the
zero-sum feature of speculation is not present. Thus, the literature on speculative
attacks was able to make progress using the rational expectations approach despite
the no-trade theorems.
One example of such a model is in Salant (1983). Salant’s concern is to explain
the failure of governmental attempts to stabilize commodity prices by using buﬀer
stocks. The main point is that an attempt to peg the price will eventually fail,
39for speculators will correctly anticipate situations where the stock is insuﬃcient to
maintain the policy, and rationally buy the remaining stock in a short period of
time. Flood and Garber (1994) have used similar arguments to discuss attacks on
currencies. Speculation, in this context, refers to anticipating price changes due to
governmental policy inconsistency.
1.5 Concluding remarks
The information-based literature on speculation has focused on its compatibility of
the rationality assumption. A ﬁrst avenue lead to the conclusion that speculation is
an incomplete-market phenomenon, since diﬀerences in belief explanations to trade
could be completely exhausted in just one round of trade, if markets were complete.
However, there is the belief that the amount of trade explained in this fashion falls
short as compared to actual trading volume in asset markets. This approach implies
that speculation improves welfare, since it serves as a substitute for missing markets.
What followed was an attempt to explain belief heterogeneity by diﬀerences in
information. The result, however, pointed in the opposite direction. Rational agents
cannot bet against each other based exclusively on private information. As a conse-
quence, prices must reﬂect all available information, guiding correctly the allocation
of resources. Asset pricing models were constructed typically over the assumption
of belief homogeneity.
40The ﬁnance literature understood, then, that analyzing informational issues re-
quires breaking full revelation of prices. This role was taken by the so-called noise
traders, presumably rational traders with unpredictable behavior. Ironically, under
this approach regular investors were seen as creating noise in an otherwise pure specu-
lative market, switching roles with speculators, who in the traditional literature were
the (not always welcomed) visitors.
This literature turned out to be very productive. However, several empirical
anomalies started to become apparent, like the excess volatility puzzle and the equity
premium puzzle. Although we cannot talk about consensus, the incompatibility of
these ﬁndings with the popular models of asset pricing has gained wider acceptance.
In particular, the predominant interpretation is to see them as limitations of models
based on rationality.
Recently, some models based on speciﬁc forms of irrationality, notably overconﬁ-
dence, have shown to explain many of the existing anomalies. Moreover, evolutionary
arguments have challenged a conjecture previously rooted in the profession, namely,
that irrational behavior could not survive. These ideas naturally revive the interest
on welfare eﬀects of speculation. For instance, what Keynes thought about liquid-
ity as a promoter of speculation sixty years ago, did not make sense under rational
expectations but could be compatible with the recent twist in asset pricing:
“The only radical cure for the crisis of conﬁdence which aﬄict the eco-
nomic life of the modern world would be to allow the individual no choice
41between consuming his income and ordering the production of the speciﬁc
capital-asset which, even though it be on precarious evidence, impresses
him as the most promising investment available to him. [...] But that
would avoid the disastrous, cumulative and far-reaching repercussions of
its being open to him, when thus assailed by doubts, to spend his income
neither on the one nor on the other.” (Op. cit., page 161).
It is too early to assess whether irrationality-based models do a better job than
rationality-based models in predicting investor behavior and market outcomes; and
even more to assess the desirability of promoting ﬁnancial systems not based on
liquidity creation. However, from an empirical perspective, this is a promising avenue.
And from a theoretical perspective, it shows the need for more general models of
economic survival, and for welfare concepts capable of including individuals who





Asset prices are usually thought to summarize all payoﬀ-relevant information that is
economically available to market participants. In this view, every trader appraises
the chances of price appreciation or depreciation and dividend changes, and translates
that appraisal into a decision that, collectively, determines the price. However, when
modeling such idea a surprising result is readily found, which we refer to as the
paradox of informationally eﬃcient markets.
In order to have an incentive to trade based on private information, one must
believe that the particular piece of information at hand is not “included” in the price.
43But if everybody in possession of news actually were to trade, then the price of the
asset would “reﬂect” all that private information. Moreover, it would reﬂect more
and better information than what any individual trader might possess. Indeed,
just by observing the price, that better information could be inferred by everybody,
making the formerly private information freely available to all market participants.
Thus, the paradox of informationally eﬃcient markets relates to the problem of the
incentives to use information.
Yet, this paradox obtains in Walrasian economies, characterized by the fact that
the price at which all transactions are carried out is publicly observed, and where
unrestricted competition makes the law of one price hold. This picture corresponds
to centralized markets, like the ones organized around exchanges.
There are, however, other asset markets that do not operate in this centralized
fashion. Let us consider, for instance, the foreign exchange market: most of the
transactions take place in private, bilateral agreements, and the marketplace is really
a phone network. In cases where transactions take place in this manner, it is not
clear how information will be included in prices.
To study this issue, we analyze a random matching model where both, informed
and uninformed sellers, make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to anonymous buyers, which
could also be informed or uninformed. In this setting, the price cannot have any
informational content, for every type of trader should make the same oﬀer if she does
not want to either reveal herself or be easily imitated by someone who prefers to hide
44behind her. Whoever deviates by making a diﬀerent oﬀer, either reveals information
–thereby making it worthless– or provides the incentive to be imitated by the type
she wants to separate from. The only sequential equilibrium is a pooling one, with
a unique price. As a consequence, the price entails no further information than what
is commonly known.
Although this result is robust to the informational structure, there is another sense
in which it is not: competition. In eﬀect, it holds in a situation characterized by
absence of competition, since individuals cannot aﬀect the probability of being in the
market even if they are willing to pay a high price for it.
This last thought suggests that it is competition what makes prices carry infor-
mation. In fact, the feature of the model that drives the result is that the matching
is completely random, not taking into account the individual valuation of being in
the market. In that sense, the market is seen as a collection of pairwise rather than
collective agreements. When competition is introduced by auctioning the right to be
in the market, full revelation obtains.
There are several contributions that analyze the connection between market struc-
ture and price revelation. Full revelation is proved to obtain in Walrasian settings;
for instance, in Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Tirole (1982) from a general equi-
librium perspective, and in Kreps (1977) from a partial equilibrium point of view.
Imperfect competition models include Kyle (1985), who analyzes the pricing policy
of a monopolistic market maker, and Glosten (1989), who compares the consequences
45of determining prices monopolically as above, versus by a zero-proﬁtc o n d i t i o n ,a s
would be expected in a perfectly competitive market-makers market.
This paper departs from that literature in that the asset market itself is assumed to
be imperfectly competitive, as a consequence of having traders negotiating bilaterally
rather than all together as would be the case in a centralized marketplace.
There are other articles with this approach, notably Wolinski (1990), who studies
the informational content of prices’ evolution when the market meets repeatedly, and
Hopenhayn and Werner (1996), who show the connection between information and
asset liquidity. The former, however, assumes a particular form of bargaining that
precludes an equilibrium of the kind we ﬁnd here, because it allows that some agents
get negative surplus. The latter, on the other hand, assumes pre-determined trading
conditions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2.2 introduces the model,
section 2.3 is devoted to the analysis of equilibrium, while section 2.4 introduces
competition, and section 2.5 contains the concluding remarks.
2.2 The model
The decentralized market will be represented by a random matching model. There
is a continuum of risk-neutral agents, which can be classiﬁed into utility traders and
speculators. Utility traders are uninformed players that get utility from trading, that
46is, they would be willing to trade even if they faced the expectation of a capital loss
of up to a certain level x. Half of them receive utility from buying, half of them
from selling. Speculators, in turn, are those players that would trade only in the
expectation of a capital gain. Thus, their expected utilities can be written as
u =( x ∗ 1[utility traders] + expected value of the bet) ∗ 1[bet] (2.1)
where 1[utility traders] and 1[bet] are indicator functions, that take on the value 1 in the
case of utility traders and when the bet is carried out, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
Utility traders represent a fraction z% of the population.
At the beginning of the game, speculators receive a message from nature –possibly
the same across speculators– which translates into a higher or lower probability of a
higher asset price in the future. With this information at hand, they decide whether
to become buyers or sellers. At that point, buyers are randomly matched to sellers.
However, if supply and demand are of a diﬀerent size, not all agents will have the
chance to trade. If an agent is not matched with anybody else, her payoﬀ is zero.
When there is a meeting, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the buyer,
specifying the price of the transaction. No one is allowed to trade more than one
unit. If the oﬀer is accepted, the asset is transferred at the proposed price, while if it
is rejected, they both get zero.
There are two payoﬀ-relevant states of nature, θ1 and θ2,t h a th a v et h ei n t e r p r e t a -
47tion of the value of the asset going up or down, respectively. Information is modeled
in the usual way, that is, there are basic messages or signals η ∈ Λ, which are going
to be (imperfectly) observed by agents. The probability that a message η is sent by
nature is µ ≡ Pr(η). The composed messages E ∈ 2Λ are called informational events.
What events are known to a player at diﬀerent times is described by his particular
information partition. The informational structure of the game is a description of the
information partitions each type of player has, {Hτ}Υ
τ=1.
A basic message translates into a probability of a higher future price according to
π(η)=P r ( θ1|η). Since the probability of event E is Pr(E)=
P
η∈E









If a buyer, knowing that the informational event E occurred, engages in a bet
(1 − α,−α;Pr(θ1|E), Pr(θ2|E)), her expected monetary gain is given by
gE(α)=P r ( θ1|E)(1 − α)+P r ( θ2|E)(−α) (2.3)
= πE − α ≡ α
∗
E − α
Without loss of generality, assume that the basic signals are ordered, so that
πN ≤ ... ≤ π2 ≤ π1. Then, we can put in a line all fair bets –those that give an
480             α
*
N      α
*
N-1               α
*
N-2      ⋅⋅⋅⋅         α
*
1                     1
Figure 2-1: Fair bets for each possible message
expected utility of zero– as ﬁgure 2-1 shows.
Sellers come in many types {τ}Υ
1 , each one of them associated to a diﬀerent infor-
mation partition {Hτ}Υ
1 . A strategy for a type-τ seller is a function that associates
an oﬀer to each informational event, according to:
ατ : Hτ −→ α(hτ(η))
Thus, ατ(η) is the oﬀer made by an informed seller when the signal is η and, conse-
quently, she knows hτ(η). Similarly, we will write α(Λ) to denote the oﬀer made by
an uninformed seller, that is, by the one who only knows that something happened.
The resulting strategies give rise to a probability distribution over oﬀers (α), where
the probability of a particular oﬀer corresponds to the probability of all messages that
would lead to that oﬀer:
δ
i : Hτ −→ ∆{α}
Collectively, sellers generate
δ : Λ −→ ∆{α}






Buyers respond to each oﬀer by accepting or rejecting it. A buyer of type τ will
ﬁnd herself typically in an information set composed of an oﬀer α and a signal hτ(η):
στ : Hτ ×{ α} −→ [0,1]
where σ(α,η) ∈ [0,1] is the probability of accepting an oﬀer α in state η.T h e
collective choice of buyers is given by






The equilibrium will be characterized, then, by a probability distribution over
signals, oﬀers and answers.
1Actually, the strategy has as a domain the join of {Hτ}Υ
1 and not Λ, but it is written this way
for notational simplicity.










where hτ(η)=hτ(η0) ⇒ α(η)=α(η0).








































The equilibrium of this game is a pooling one, that is, all types of sellers make the
same oﬀer irrespective of the information received.
51Information Sets Expected Utilities
Sellers:
{η1} (α(η1) − α∗
1)σ(α(η1),η1)
{η2} (α(η2) − α∗
2)σ(α(η2),η2)
{η1,η2} µ1[x + α(Λ) − α∗







{η1,η2},α µ1[x + α∗
1 − α]δ(α,η1)+µ2[x + α∗
2 − α]δ(α,η2)
Table 2.1: Expected utility of an oﬀer
We will verify the validity of this claim by looking at special cases of informational
structures in increasing complexity.
Informational Structure 1: Λ = {η1,η2}, HUT = {η1,η2}, HS = {{η1},{η2}}
In this ﬁrst case there is only one type of speculator, who knows precisely what the
message was, and therefore cannot learn from anything. The expected utilities are
as in table 2.1.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that when α(η1) 6= α(η2) 6= α(Λ), the information will
be completely revealed. Thus, from an informational point of view, the knowledge
of the oﬀer will be redundant for speculators while for utility traders it will convey
information (unless the seller was also uninformed).
Consider, then, the situation of a seller upon receiving message {η1}.I n p r i n c i p l e ,
he could face another speculator that accepts up to α(η1) ≤ α∗
1 in which case there
is no way of proﬁting. But he could also face a utility trader, who would accept up
to α ≤ x + α∗
1. The best he could do, then, is to oﬀer α(η1)=x + α∗
1. Similarly,
52α(Λ) Expected utility if
α∗
2 x − µ1[α∗
1 − α∗
2]
x + α∗ 2x − (1 − z)µ2[2x + α∗ − α∗
2] x + α∗ ≤ α∗
1
x + α∗ 2xz x + α∗ ≥ α∗
1
α∗
1 x + µ2[α∗
1 − α∗
2] − (1 − z)µ2[x + α∗
1 − α∗
2] x + α∗ ≤ α∗
1
α∗
1 µ1x(1 − z) x + α∗ ≥ α∗
1
Table 2.2: Expected utility of the maximum oﬀers
upon receiving message {η2}, his best choice is α(η2)=x + α∗
2.
Under the maintained assumption that all three oﬀers are diﬀerent, the utility
traders’ oﬀer will be accepted by all types if α(Λ) ∈ [0,α∗
2], by utility traders and
speculators when the message is η1 if α(Λ) ∈ (α∗
2,x+ µ1α∗
1 + µ2α∗










Let α∗ ≡ µ1α∗
1 + µ2α∗
2. Taking the maximum of each interval as the oﬀer, they
would yield an expected utility according to table 2.2.
When x is low (x ≤ µ1[α∗
1−α∗
2] and x ≤ α∗
1−α∗), to sell cheap generates losses. The




However, when x is high (x ≥ µ1[α∗
1 − α∗
2] and x ≥ α∗
1 − α∗), α∗
2 might be the best
oﬀer.
2The value that gives zero utility to buyer utility traders when such an oﬀer could only have been
made by another utility trader is x + µ1α∗
1 + µ2α∗
2.
53This situation is not an equilibrium, though. A seller speculator with “bad news”
({η2}) could pretend to have good news ({η1})b ym a k i n gt h eo ﬀer α(η1)=α∗
1+x and
fool a utility trader; after all, he would not sell to another speculator anyway. This
misrepresentation incentive is always present, so that we will have α(η1)=α(η2).
Such a situation, however, requires too high prices to keep speculators with good
news selling. This in turn imposes a high cost on utility traders, which we assume
they are not willing to bear, that is, we will assume throughout that x is not so high
as to make utility traders accept trades they know are unfavorable to them, that is,
Assumption x ≤ 1 − α∗
2.
Alternatively, a speculator with good news may try to become a buyer. This will
be an equilibrium if the price charged by utility traders is not so high as to eliminate
proﬁts. We contend this is indeed the case:
Proposition 1 If x is low, then there exists a unique sequential equilibrium in which
when the information is {η1}, speculators take the demand side; when it is {η2},













, which is accepted by all buyers, and everybody holds con-
sistent beliefs.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that the described strategies conform a sequential equilib-
rium. Suppose that when the information is {η1}, speculators take the demand side
54and that when it is {η2}, they take the supply side. Then, an uninformed buyer will
accept it as long as his expected utility (which considers the adverse selection eﬀect
of facing speculators only when the message was {η2}) is greater than zero, that is,
when
Eu = µ1[x + α
∗
1 − α(Λ)]δ(α,η1)+µ2[x + α
∗
2 − α(Λ)]δ(α,η2) ≥ 0
⇔ µ1[x + α
∗
1 − α(Λ)]z + µ2[x + α
∗
2 − α(Λ)] ≥ 0














− α(Λ) ≥ 0
This imposes a limit on the oﬀer a utility trader can make. On the other hand, he
will maximize his utility by charging the maximum allowed (which corresponds to the
corrected expected monetary gain plus their value from trading), since the acceptance
is not sensitive to this price within this limit. Speculators with bad news, on the
other hand, are better served by becoming sellers (they would lose if they bought at
that price), and cannot charge a diﬀerent price without being discovered.
To see that the equilibrium is unique, it suﬃces to realize that no matter what the
probability of acceptance or the probability of receiving a particular oﬀer, the expected
utility of a buyer speculator will always have the opposite sign than the seller’s. Thus,
all speculators will choose the same side of the market (unless their expected utility
is zero, but that will not happen because of their informational advantage). That












as the unique price.
55Notice that the equilibrium price does not coincide with E(α|{η1,η2})=α∗
1µ1 +
α∗
2µ2. On the one hand, there is the extra component “x”, reﬂecting the strong
bargaining power the structure of the game gives to sellers. On the other hand, the
weights on the expectation are diﬀerent, which is explained by the adverse selection
eﬀect. As a matter of fact, it is the chance of facing a speculator what corrects the ex-
pectation, moving it towards the worst-case scenario as the proportion of speculators
increases in the population.
This fact can be illustrated as follows: suppose a speculator believes that the price
will drop. He will never take the demand side unless the buyer is willing to pay such a
high price that the information is actually valueless. In such a case, only the position
of seller is valuable, regardless of the information at hand. This situation was ruled
out by assumption (x low).
One might wonder if more complicated informational structures would change the
nature of equilibrium. We explore that problem in the next two versions of the model.
Informational Structure 2: Λ = {η1,η2,...,ηN},N>2,H UT = {Λ},H S =
{{ηn}}N
n=1.
This informational structure is slightly more complicated, but the previous result
carries over without diﬃculty. What is diﬀerent now is that there are many price
expectations speculators might hold, and consequently various degrees of intensity
of the willingness to trade they could have. However, intensity of desire does not
56translate into intensity of action, because of risk neutrality. Therefore, from the
point of view of a utility trader, it does not make any diﬀerence, except for the fact
that he would now modify his reservation price by a slightly more complicated adverse
selection cost.
Proposition 2 If x is low, then there exists a unique sequential equilibrium in which
when the information {ηn} points to an α∗
n ≤ α(Λ), speculators take the demand side;
when it points to an α∗
































(where e η is deﬁned by α∗(e η)=α(Λ), G ≡ {η1,...,e η} and B ≡ {e η,...,ηN} = Λ\G),
which is accepted by all matched buyers, and everybody holds consistent beliefs.
Proof. Similar to that of proposition 1.
Informational Structure 3: #Λ = N>2,H UT = {Λ},H S ∈ {Hτ}Υ
τ=1.
Speculators now receive diﬀerent (composed) messages, while utility traders are as
before. Each type of speculator is represented by a diﬀerent partition of Λ =
{η1,η2,...,ηN}. This has the interpretation that when the message sent is ηi,at y p e - m
speculator will know that the event hm(ηi) occurred. Each type is actually informed
of a diﬀerent fact, and this is common knowledge.
57In this case there is a qualitative diﬀe r e n c e :i ti sp o s s i b l et h a ts p e c u l a t o r st r a d e
with each other, since the existence of utility traders prevents learning the identity of
t h eo p p o n e n tf r o mt h e i ra c t i o n s( t h eM i l g r o m - S t o k e yt y p eo fr e a s o n i n g ) . N e e d l e s s
to say that how frequently this would happen depends on the actual form of the
partitions and the distribution of messages.
Still, our main conclusion above remains a valid one: Speculators will choose their
side on the market based purely on their private information, and those who become
sellers will make the same oﬀer an uninformed investor would.
Proposition 3 If x is low, then there exists a sequential equilibrium in which when
the information {ηi} points to an α∗
h(ηi) ≤ α(Λ), speculators take the demand side;
when it points to an α∗
h(ηi) ≥ α(Λ), they take the supply side; all matched sellers make
the oﬀer α(h(ηi)) = α(Λ), which is accepted by all matched buyers, and everybody
holds consistent beliefs.
2.4 Introducing competition
This section modiﬁes the model to introduce competition in the form of a market for
being matched. Suppose that prior to being matched, people have to buy a position
either as a buyer or as a seller. A Walrasian market for positions would require the
probability of a match to be 1 for buyers and sellers, that is, market clearing. In a
more general way, we could say that the mechanism auctions oﬀ a given probability
58of being matched.
Let ρs and ρb be the probabilities that a seller and a buyer get matched, respec-
tively, and let P(ρs) and P(ρb) be the prices they pay for such probabilities. In
general, these prices may depend on the signals, P(·,η).
Consider the case where ρs = ρb =1(Walrasian). When news are bad, speculators
rush to sell, bidding up selling positions, and creating a surplus of buying positions.
When news are good, buying positions should be expensive and selling positions
cheap. But this implies that the price of a particular position fully reveals the
message.
This is indeed an equilibrium. When news are bad, P(ρb,η2)=0and ρb =1 .
Buyers infer that η = η2, and adjust their demands to α∗
2 + x. Sellers know that if
they are matched they will get α∗
2 +x. Speculators, then, are willing to pay at most
α∗
2+x for a seller position, while utility traders α∗
2+2x. Thus, seller positions sell for
P(ρs,η2) ∈ α∗
2 + x,α∗
2 +2 x],a n dρs =1thereby completely excluding speculators.
Similarly, when there are good news, P(ρs,η1)=x = P(ρb,η1), α = α∗
1, and
ρb =1=ρs. Actually, as α = α∗
1 + x − P(ρb) discourages speculators from buying
for any P(ρb) ≥ x
2
3,i ts u ﬃces that they do not have incentives to become sellers4.I n
this equilibrium, utility traders trade with utility traders and prices are informative.
It is easy to see that the same reasoning applies to the more complex informational
3Since buyers’ surplus is α∗
1 − α∗
1 + x − 2P(ρb) ≤ 0 if x − 2P(ρb) ≤ 0.
4If they do, they get α∗
1 + x − P(ρb) − α∗
1 − P(ρs) ≤ 0,w h i c hi s ,x ≤ P(ρb)+P(ρs).
59structures studied before. The essential feature is that all investors participate to-
gether in forming the price. As long as the publicly known price is aﬀected by market
conditions, it reveals them.
2.5 Concluding remarks
In the previous chapter, we saw that full information revelation obtained under any
voluntary trading arrangement, provided that we had common priors, a Pareto-
optimal initial allocation and common knowledge of actions. In this chapter, we
have departed from the above on the optimality of the original resource allocation.
O u rm a i nc o n c l u s i o ni st h a tt h ee x t e n tt ow h i c hp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o ni sr e v e a l e d
in the trading process depends crucially on how competitive is the environment in
which traders interact. In Walrasian economies, in particular, prices are revealing
because of the extreme competition level embedded on them.
60Chapter 3




If speculation, or information-based trading, is to be proﬁtable, it must be at the ex-
pense of regular traders or investors, which we term utility traders. Utility traders use
asset markets for non-speciﬁc purposes, usually categorized as consumption smooth-
ing, insurance, investment, etc. Even though markets are beneﬁcial for them, they
will choose not to participate in the event that the adverse selection cost imposed by
the action of speculators exceeds the beneﬁts of using the market.
61Nevertheless, as it is widely known, the market requires utility traders to oper-
ate, since private information alone is not suﬃcient to create trade, that is, a market
composed solely of speculators will be characterized by zero volume (no-trade the-
orem1). Therefore, we conclude that there is a limit to the amount of speculative
transactions that a given market can aﬀord, relative to non-speculative transactions
that take place. If this ratio crosses that border, transactions will be zero, exactly as
if there were no utility traders at all, and the no-trade theorem would apply. That
ratio is determined by the maximum rents that can be extracted from utility traders
before they abandon the market.
We explore this intuition: the existence of a market depends on the composition
of its participants, according to their motivations for trading. Moreover, we ask
how these limits vary across diﬀerent market regimes. In particular, we compare
a centralized (intermediated) market regime to a decentralized (non-intermediated)
one, ﬁnding that the former is more prone to speculation. Our model tells us that
the key issue determining this is the ability that an eventual intermediary has for
transferring utility from the incumbent speculators to new ones –an ability generated
by the act of charging transaction fees as a method of collecting proﬁts. In fact, they
provide a mechanism to diminish the individual return to information, decreasing the
informational rent, so that for a ﬁxed value of trading or surplus, more speculative
1For a version of this theorem, see Milgrom and Stokey (1982).
62transactions can be supported.
The analysis also opens two branches: on the one hand, it suggests a reason for
the existence of intermediaries in ﬁnancial markets, based on the adverse selection
cost that the uninformed bear when they trade with the informed. This is unrelated
to the incentive problems advanced by Leland and Pyle (1977). On the other hand,
it allows the study of the conditions under which there will be a spontaneous move
towards intermediation, or desintermediation. Both branches are brieﬂy discussed
at the end.
To address these issues, we use a random matching model in which players are
paired to voluntarily bet on the occurrence of two states. Trade is modeled by the
simultaneous acceptance of a bet. By modeling a betting game rather than a game in
which players actually trade an asset, we hope to simplify the analysis while capturing
what is essential to it. The key observation is that ultimately, any decision of buying
or selling an asset involves a bet: whoever buys is betting that the price will not
drop the following day, whoever sells is betting on the opposite. Regardless of the
particular reasons any person could have to buy or sell an asset, the decision of doing
it today rather than tomorrow reveals certain level of trust on the favorability of
today’s conditions over tomorrow’s: that is where the bet lies. What we are missing
in the simpliﬁc a t i o ni st h ef a c tt h a tp e o p l em a ya c t u a l l yc h o o s ew h i c hs i d eo ft h e
market they want to be in, but this amounts to say that the bets are endogenous.
We will discuss some methodological issues at the end.
63To summarize, then, our main results are:
1. Given a certain value from trading, there is a maximum amount of speculative
activity that a decentralized market can sustain. If the proportion of speculative
over non-speculative bets passes that limit, the market shuts down (no-trade
region).
2. That limiting amount is zero in an economy with a unique intermediary, that
is, the intermediary is always able to keep the market open.
3. Moreover, the intermediary provides higher liquidity and volume is greater than
in the decentralized market, increasing welfare.
The present research is connected with two areas. On the one hand, we have
the adverse selection problem that the uninformed face when trading with the spec-
ulators, or informed —a lemons problem—. Milgrom and Stokey (1982) provided an
example of the “no trade theorem,” example on which the present model is based.
However, they took the view that the theorem implied the incompatibility of the ra-
tional expectations model with reality. Glosten (1989), in a diﬀerent setting (actually,
the standard in the ﬁnance literature) analyzes the diﬀerences between competitive
vs. monopolistic market makers. He concludes that when the asymmetries are more
severe, the monopolist is better because it increases liquidity, since it is not forced
to make zero proﬁts on each transaction. However, he does not consider the equilib-
rium without market makers, nor does he analyze the limiting amount of speculation.
64Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) study the equilibria with an informed monopolist
and a continuum of uninformed risk averse traders, in a setting similar to Glosten’s.
A second literature, from ﬁnance, refers to noisy rational expectations equilibria.
A seminal paper is Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980). We do not address the issue of
information revelation; rather, we explicit l yi n c o r p o r a t et h er o l eo ft h en o i s et r a d e r s
as utility traders. Utility traders are simply individuals who place a positive value on
exchange. As opposed to noise traders, however, their behavior is endogenous. In
that exogenous behavior paradigm, it is the noise that prevents the no-trade result,
while in our model it is the surplus they generate what prevents it. The problem of
learning here was assumed away, for there is no aggregate statistic about the state of
the economy from which the players could infer something. Instead, what we need
utility traders for is to generate a rent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the model.
Section 3.3 is devoted to the analysis of the decentralized market, while section 3.4
studies the market with an intermediary. Section 3.5 concludes and discusses possible
extensions.
3.2 The model: a betting game
There is a continuum of risk neutral players with common priors. Half of them will be
assigned the role of a “buyer”, the other half the role of a “seller”. There is nothing
65to buy or sell; the name of “buyer” or “seller” is purely metaphorical. At date 1, every
buyer is randomly matched with a seller, and vice versa. Then, the speculators will
get to see a signal ω ∈ {ω1,ω2} while the utility traders see nothing. At that point,
everyone is oﬀered a bet: buyers are oﬀered the possibility of winning $1 if state θ1
happens while losing $1 if θ2 happens; sellers are oﬀered the complementary bet, that
is, the possibility of losing $1 if state θ1 happens while winning $1 if θ2 happens. In
each match, the bet is carried out only when they both accept; if any player, the one
i nt h er o l eo ft h eb u y e ro rt h eo n ei nt h er o l eo fas e l l e r ,r e j e c t st h eb e t ,t h e yb o t h
get $0. After conﬁrming the acceptance, date 2 starts and everybody gets to see the
state θ ∈ {θ1,θ2} and the payments are carried out. The bet is ex-ante a fair game,
that is, the prior probability of θ1 is 0.5. We will further assume that each signal, ω1
and ω2, is equally likely.
The names of speculators and utility traders are assigned depending on the par-
ticular form of the utility function of each player. In general,
u =( x ∗ 1[utility traders] + expected value of the bet) ∗ 1[bet] (3.1)
where 1[utility traders] and 1[bet] are indicator functions, that take on the value 1 in the
case of utility traders and when the bet is carried out, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
This is to say that utility traders enjoy gambling, getting a utility level of x>0
just for betting. However, they are uninformed. On the other hand, speculators are
66informed but gambling is a neutral for them. Thus, in this model a pure speculator
is someone who would not participate if he did not expect a direct monetary gain by
betting, while a utility trader is someone who would participate even if she expected
up to a certain monetary loss.
Notice that we could have deﬁned four types, instead of two. We omitted the
informed that enjoy gambling and the uninformed that regard gambling as a neutral.
This exclusion was deliberately made in the sake of simplicity. However, it comes at
no cost: these types play no role. Their behavior would be the same as the two types
that remained. In addition, it allows us to identify motivations with people, which
cannot be done in reality as easily as here.
Although this separation of traders according to their motivations is not something
that we could hope to do as easily in practice, there is an argument to identify
speculators with better information: if information were costly, speculators would
have the highest demands for it, since they are the ones that would get the highest
surplus from it. This is so because they are prepared to use information more fully
than utility traders, in the sense that the arrival of even weak evidence will change
the behavior of a speculator but not the behavior of a utility trader.
Let us say that Pr(θ1|ω1) > 0.5=P r ( θ1) > Pr(θ1|ω2), so that a buyer would ﬁnd it
favorable to accept after receiving the signal ω1.L e t “ z” be the percentage of utility
traders in the total population, and “g” the expected gain for a buyer conditional on
receiving a signal ω1 (our symmetry assumption implies that g is also the expected
67Buyer Seller
Speculator (1 − z)/2( 1 − z)/2
Utility trader (z/2) (z/2)
TOTAL 50% 50%
Table 3.1: The distribution of types.
gain of a seller conditional on receiving a signal ω2,s i n c ePr(θ2|ω2)=P r ( θ1|ω1)).
Then,
g =( 1 ) P r ( θ1|ω1)+( −1)Pr(θ2|ω1)=
Pr(θ1 ∧ ω1) − Pr(θ2 ∧ ω1)
Pr(ω1)
(3.2)
=( 1 ) P r ( θ2|ω2)+( −1)Pr(θ1|ω2)
The distribution of types is common knowledge, and is as in table 3.1.
Throughout we will assume that x<g ; otherwise, the utility from gambling would
be so high relative to the expected monetary gain/loss, that a utility player would
not care about timing his decision. It follows that a speculator in possession of good
news will always accept, while in possession of bad news never will: there is nothing
else that such a person could learn either by direct observation or by inferring from
other people’s behavior, that would make him change his mind2. He knows whether
2This is a consequence of assuming that there is one signal common to all, rather than one for
each individual. The latter would be required to analyze the information aggregation problem,
which we do not aim to do here.
68Upon receiving the signal... ω1 ω2
Buyer




2(x − g)Pr(opponent accepts if ω1)
+1
2(x + g)Pr(opponent accepts if ω2)
ª
Seller




2(x − g)Pr(opponent accepts if ω1)
+1
2(x + g)Pr(opponent accepts if ω2)
ª
Table 3.2: Expected utilities.
t h eg a m ei sf a i ro ru n f a i rt oh i m .
In this way, the problem is in the hands of utility traders: if they do not participate,
we get no trade and no market can exist. They will, on the other hand, accept as
long as the monetary loss due to the participation of speculators does not outweigh
the utility from gambling, x. Then, we have:
We can verify in the table that for a speculator, the expected utility is proportional
to g or −g, so that the decision is unambiguous, as we claimed earlier. However, this
is not true for a utility trader; we analyze her decision in the next section.
Before moving into that, we would like to discuss brieﬂy the probability that the
opponent accepts. This probability may depend on the matching rule. So far, we
have assumed that the mechanism creates matches before the players get to observe
the signal, but it is perfectly possible to conceive, for instance, one in which the
mechanism asks about intentions before making matches; in this case, we could have
situations in which the largest side of the market gets rationed while the other side






Table 3.3: Who accepts the bet.
try to maximize trade. The reason is that in one of the sides everybody wishes to
accept, so that it is always partially rationed. Nevertheless, the conclusions of this
analysis will also extend to other matching rules, as long as those rules give rise to
probabilities that are proportional to the one we consider, though the utility level of
each player will be diﬀerent.
3.3 Decentralized equilibrium
We now turn to the analysis of who accepts the bet. So far, we know that behavior
will be as table 3.3 shows.
We also know that for the market to exist at all, we need utility traders to accept.













There are two possibilities: a utility trader can be matched to another uninformed
utility trader, in which case she faces a fair game that is worth accepting, because
70she gets x. But she could also be matched to a speculator, a case in which she is
deﬁnitely facing an unfair game, that she clearly would be better oﬀ avoiding. As
she cannot distinguish a utility trader from a speculator, she would participate if she
thinks that it is likely enough that she would ﬁnd herself in the ﬁrst situation and
not in the second one.
Condition (3.3) embodies the above reasoning, giving a precise meaning to what
is “likely enough”. The probability of facing an unfair game is determined by the
proportion of speculators in the population. Depending on how valuable information
is, it will be required a diﬀerent level of utility x (gains from trade) in order to support
trade for a given composition of the population. The more valuable information is,
that is, the bigger g is, the higher the adverse selection problem to the uninformed,
and as a consequence, the higher the value of trading the asset must be so that she
still wants to trade. Alternatively, for a ﬁxed value of x, to maintain trade while
increasing g will require a reduction in the proportion of informed.
In other words, the cost of the adverse selection problem to the utility traders is
determined together by g, the individual information rent, and (1−z), the probability
of being matched with a speculator, that add up to 1
2g(1 − z). This cost must be
smaller than the utility she gets by gambling, x, with probability 1
2(1 + z).
It is interesting to note that there is a trade-oﬀ between the maximum proportion
of speculators in the economy and the predictive power of their information. For
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Figure 3-1: Minimum proportion of utility traders as a function of x
number of speculators can be very large with respect to the number of utility traders,
that is, a very small proportion of the transactions needs to be non-speculative. This
appears to be the case in the foreign exchange market, characterized by a huge volume
of trade, many times larger than needs as means of exchange would justify, and traders
making many tiny proﬁts on each transaction.
Another way to look at condition (3.3) is this: x and z determine the size of the pie,
which in the limiting population composition is completely exhausted by speculators;
g is the size of individual portions, i.e., the per-speculator rent. How many of them
we can get is a matter of dividing xz by g. The existence of an intermediary will
change both, the size of the pie and the size of individual portions.
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Figure 3-2: Minimum proportion of utility traders as a function of
g
x.
whose size depends on the value of private information, g. Put another way, the
minimum proportion of non-speculative transactions is determined by the potential
expected loss relative to the value of owning the asset for one period.
Observe in ﬁgure 3-2 the concavity of the function: z becomes nearly insensitive
to
g
x for high values of this variable.
3.4 One intermediary
Notice that in the decentralized equilibrium utility traders lose to speculators; the
only reason why they still trade is that the probability of being matched to play a fair
73game and therefore gain the utility from gambling overcomes the risk of losing to the
better-informed players. Imagine now that one player announces that she will accept
all bets, from anyone, no matter what. That single player is telling the uninformed
that she will solve their adverse selection problem, so naturally they will prefer to
trade with her, rather than in the anonymous decentralized market, even if they are
required to pay a small transaction fee. However, if all the uninformed prefer to
trade with her, then the decentralized economy is left only with speculators, making
t h em a r k e td i s a p p e a rb yt h en o - t r a d et h e o r e m . T h u s ,s h ew i l lc e n t r a l i z ea l lt r a d i n g ,
since utility traders prefer to trade with her, while speculators are forced to trade
with her when they lose the decentralized market.
In this section, however, we will not address the issue of whether a desintermedi-
ated market will move towards intermediation. Rather, we will assume the existence
of an intermediary, and we will ask about the maximum speculative activity that such
a market can aﬀord.
The ﬁrst choice variable of this intermediary, that we assume is informed, is to
accept or reject a bet from any single player that communicates its intention of betting
with her. As bettors are anonymous, except for their roles, this variable takes the
form of a probability of accepting to each of them, maybe conditioning on whether
she faces a buyer or a seller, and on the message received. The second choice variable
is the transaction fee.
We advanced earlier that the transaction fee is the only way the intermediary has
74to collect proﬁts. The reason is that if she tries to proﬁt from her private informa-
tion, by giving higher probability of acceptance in the cases in which the public is at
a disadvantage, she is replicating the adverse selection problem the utility traders are
trying to avoid. To attract them, she must oﬀer better conditions than the decentral-
ized market. However, in this way she collects money only from utility traders, while
by charging a transaction fee she will also get money from the speculators, thereby
increasing total revenue.
Let yr
ω be the proportion of bets accepted from role r players (r = b if buyer, r = s
if seller) after receiving a signal ω,a n dl e tc denote the transaction fee. The problem













































subject to the participation of utility traders and speculators3,t h a ti s ,


















and c ≤ g.
Expected proﬁt is, then, composed of the transaction fee that is collected from all
buyers and just utility traders among sellers if the information is ω1,o rf r o ma l ls e l l e r s
3It is possible for the monopolist to charge c>gby giving back to utility traders the diﬀerence
(c − x) in the form of accepting more unfavorable bets to herself, thereby excluding speculators
completely. However, this strategy is dominated, so it will never be used.
75and just utility traders among buyers, if ω2; plus, the expected payoﬀ formed by the
gap between buyers and sellers on each ω, everything weighted by the probability of
accepting from a buyer or seller on each state.
We can further simplify the problem by exploiting the symmetry between specu-





ω2, where subscripts “u”a n d“ f” stand for unfavorable and favorable






{yu(c − g)+yfz(c + g)} (3.5)





and c ≤ g
It can readily be seen that the problem of the monopolist is to balance two forces:
on the one hand, she would prefer to avoid the adverse selection cost (c − g) by
avoiding all unfavorable bets, while accepting all favorable ones; however, moving in
such direction minimizes the transaction fee that can be charged and endangers the
participation of utility traders.
Observe that to set yu = yf =1 , that is, to accept all bets, yields positive proﬁts
as long as x ≥ g1−z
1+z, which is precisely the condition for the decentralized market to
exist. This is to say that, if the condition for the existence of a decentralized market
76is met, the condition for the existence of an intermediated market4 is also met.
Moreover, even when the above condition is not satisﬁed, it is possible for the inter-










> 0, meaning that there is a better strategy than accepting all
bets in such case. Therefore, the optimal strategy is able to yield positive proﬁts
even in cases in which x<g 1−z
1+z.











(1,1,x) if x ≥ g1−z
2z
(3.6)
T w oe l e m e n t sa r en o t e w o r t h y . F i r s t ,w h a ti st h et h e m eo ft h i sp a p e r ,t h em o -
nopolist is able to make proﬁts and keep the market open in any circumstances in
which there is some value from trading (x>0). The reason the intermediary is able
t ok e e pt h em a r k e to p e ni ns i t u a t i o n si nw h i c ht h ed e c e n t r a l i z e dm a r k e tw o u l ds h u t
down is that by charging a transaction fee to speculators as well as utility traders,
she is able to reduce the individual informational rents, thus allowing a larger number
(proportion) of speculators in the population.
Secondly, it is not optimal for the monopolist to use her information “against”
4The reader may have noticed that in the paper we only refer to a monopolistic intermediated
market, not to any possible intermediated market. Yet, we talk about the existence of intermediated
markets in general. The reason for this is that if there are not enough rents for a monopolist to
survive, there can be no place for more than one ﬁrm.
77her customers, in the sense that she will never be more inclined to accept favorable
than unfavorable bets to herself. Instead of oﬀe r i n gs o m e“ a d v e r s es e l e c t i o n ”t oh e r
clients, she will oﬀer some “favorable selection,” if any. This is so because that way
she increases the transaction fee utility traders are willing to pay, thereby allowing a
greater surplus extraction from speculators.
Nevertheless, keeping the market open is not the only diﬀerence between these
two regimes. There is also a diﬀerence on the total number of transactions. In fact,
in the decentralized economy only
(1+z)
2 % of the possible bets actually take place due
to “incorrect” matches, while by not having any matching problem the intermediated
market fulﬁlls 100% of the possible matches. This implies that the total surplus
generated in the former regime is proportional to
(1+z)
2 x, while it is proportional to x
in the centralized market. Therefore, from this perspective the intermediated market
is more eﬃcient than the decentralized one.
The increased liquidity also means that the expected utility (before deducing
transaction fees) of speculators is higher, an eﬀect that goes in the opposite direction
from the transaction fee. It turns out that when the intermediary sets yu = yf =1 ,i n
our example they cancel out exactly, explaining why the conditions for the existence of
a decentralized market and a centralized one in which the intermediary is committed
to accept all bets are the same.
The existence of a better strategy than always accepting bets in this limiting case,
as shown in our example, explains that the market may still exist under intermedia-
78tion.
3.5 Concluding remarks
We have compared centralized versus decentralized asset markets in a metaphorical
way, by analyzing betting games. Our main conclusion, that a centralized market
could exist even when a decentralized one would not, rests on both the fact that by
charging a transaction fee the monopolist is able to extract utility from the informed
to sustain a larger proportion of them in the population which otherwise would be
impossible, and the fact that the monopolist is better suited to deal with asymmetries
in the population and the information structure. These ideas go beyond the limited
scope of our simple model.
In particular, we have made the following simplifying assumptions.
1. The signals are equally likely (symmetry). If they are not, then the condi-
tion for the existence of a decentralized market would be given by the more
restrictive of the two participation constraints (the one for the utility traders
on the demand side, and the one for the utility traders on the supply side),
while the intermediary has the ability of “squeezing” utility traders on both
s i d e ss i m u l t a n e o u s l y . T h es a m ei st r u ea b o u tt h ec o m p o s i t i o no fs p e c u l a t o r st o
utility traders in both sides of the market, that is, if speculators are more con-
centrated among buyers, or among sellers. In other words, the monopolist can
79exploit asymmetries, either in the population or in the informational structure.
2. Each player cannot bet more than $1. This does not seem to be important,
insofar as players are anonymous: we can allow for “larger” players with no
substantial change, as long as their bets are bounded.
3. The value of trading is the same across utility traders, and informed traders
do not get utility from gambling. Relaxing this assumption would only give
continuity to the frontier, leaving the rationale of its existence unchanged.
4. Players do not choose which side of the market they are in. To some extent,
this is true, for unless short sales are allowed, not owning the asset clearly de-
ﬁnes the side of the bet one can take. However, the same does not hold for
someone who owns the asset: without liquidity constraints, it is always possible
to take the other side too. In any event, this assumption is restrictive just
for utility traders, since we can imagine that it is the same group of specula-
tors that chooses side before being paired rather than two groups being active
exchangeably as presented.
5. The populations have the same size. This also seems to be restrictive. We can
think of this as meaning that at the current price of the asset —which we do not
model— demand equals supply.
A question suggested by the present exercise is: Do we necessarily go from a de-
80centralized to a centralized market? In our example, the answer is on the aﬃrmative,
since the condition for the existence of a decentralized market is suﬃcient to guar-
antee that an intermediary accepting all bets will get positive proﬁts while oﬀering a
transaction fee smaller than the adverse selection cost that utility traders face in the
decentralized market. However, we do not know whether the same answer holds in
more general cases.
The following questions are, naturally, what would change in the presence of
competition, and whether there will necessarily be competitive forces in a centralized
market. Those questions are left for future research.
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